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We show that, given two matchings of which say the second is stable, if (a) no firm
prefers the first matching to the second, and (b) no firm and the worker it is paired with
under the second matching prefer each other to their respective assignments in the first
matching, then no worker prefers the second matching to the first. This result is a
strengthening of a result originally due to Knuth (1976). A theorem due to Roth and
Sotomayor (1990), says that if the number of workers increases, then there is a non-
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one. We provide a new proof of this result using mathematical induction. This result
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1. Introduction : A salient feature of many markets is to match one kind of agent
with another. This is particularly true, in the case of assigning workers to firms.
Such markets are usually studied with the help of “ two sided matching models”
introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962). The emphasis in that work was on
college admissions and marriage. None the less, the model is general enough to
accommodate several other types of assignment problems.
The solution concept proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962), called a stable
matching, requires that there should not exist two agents, each on a different side
of the market, who prefer each other, to the individual they have been paired with.
Gale and Shapley (1962) proved, that given any such two sided matching model,
with one set consisting of firms and the other set consisting of workers, there was
always a stable matching which no firm thought was inferior to any other stable
matching, and there was always a stable matching that no worker thought was
inferior to any other stable matching. The first was called an F – optimal stable
matching (i.e. stable matching optimal for firms) and the second one a W –
optimal stable matching (i.e. stable matching optimal for workers). An overview
of the considerable literature that has evolved out of the work of Gale and Shapley
(1962), is available in Roth and Sotomayor (1990).
The first significant result that we present here is a strengthening of a result
originally due to Knuth (1976). The original result said that given any two stable
matchings for a two-sided matching problem, if no firm prefers the first matching
to the second, then no worker prefers the second matching to the first. In this
paper we show that, given two matchings of which say the second is stable, if (a)
no firm prefers the first matching to the second, and (b) no firm and the worker it
is paired with under the second matching prefer each other to their respective
assignments in the first matching, then no worker prefers the second matching to
the first.  2 
A theorem due to Roth and Sotomayor (1990), says that if the number of workers 
increases, then there is a non-empty subset of firms and the set of workers they 
are assigned to under the F – optimal stable matching, such that given any stable 
matching for the old two-sided matching problem and any stable matching for the 
new one, every firm in the set prefers the new matching to the old one and every 
worker in the set prefers the old matching to the new one. We provide a proof of 
this result using mathematical induction. Whereas the original proof used graph 
theory, our proof does not. In fact, the original proof was non-inductive.This 
result requires the use of a theorem due to Gale and Sotomayor (1985 a,b), which 
says that with more workers around, firms prefer the new optimal stable 
matchings to the corresponding ones of the old two-sided matching problem, 
while the opposite is true for workers. This result was originally proved in Gale 
and Sotomayor (1985 a,b), by using the lattice structure of stable matchings. 
Following recent approaches by Roth (2001), to arrive at new proofs of several 
existing results by directly appealing to the deferred acceptance procedue used by 
Gale and Shapley (1962), as for instance the Weak Pareto Optimality Property of 
F- optimal stable matchings and the Blocking Lemma of Demange, Gale and 
Sotomayor (1987), we provide an alternative proof of the Gale and Sotomayor 
theorem discussed above, based directly on the deferred acceptance procedure. 
Our proof does not rely on the lattice structure of stable matchings.  
Wolfstetter (1999) has a lucid discussion of such problems, where every matching 
is required to map the set of firms, bijectively onto the set of workers. In the 
traditional literature on matching theory, such models are known as marriage 
models. Moulin (1995) also contains an easily accessible discussion of the 
marriage model. 
 
2.  The Model : There are two non empty finite and disjoint sets: F of firms and W of 
workers. Each firm f ∈F has preferences over W ∪ {f} represented by a linear 
order Rf (: a binary relation R on a non empty subset of F∪W is said to be a linear 
order if it is reflexive, complete, anti- symmetric and transitive) and each worker 
w ∈W has preferences over F ∪ {w} represented by a linear order Rw. Given a 
binary relation R on F∪W and a non-empty subset S of F∪W, let RS = R 
∩(S×S) and let P(R) = { (x,y) ∈R / (y,x) ∉R} denote the asymmetric part of R. 
A two-sided matching problem G is an array < F, W, (Rx)x∈F∪W >. Given a two-
sided matching problem G, f∈F and w∈W, the acceptable set for f, denoted A(f) 
= {w∈W/ (w,f) ∈Rf} and acceptable set for w, denoted A(w) = {f∈F/ (f,w) ∈Rw}. 
A pair (f,w) ∈F ×W, is said to be mutually acceptable if w∈A(f) and f∈A(w). 
Given, x,y,z∈F∪W, we denote (y,z) ∈Rx by y ≥x z and (y,z) ∈P(Rx) by y >x z. 
Given a two-sided matching problem G, a matching for G is a bijection µ from 
F∪W to itself such that : 
(i)  for all x ∈F∪W: µ(x) ∈A(x) ∪{x}; 
(ii)  for all x ∈F∪W: µ(µ(x)) = x. 
Since the identity function on F∪ W is a matching every two-sided matching 
problem admits at least one matching.   3 
Given a matching µ for a two-sided matching problem G, a pair (f,w) ∈F×W is 
said to block µ, if f >w µ(w) and w >f µ(f) . The matching µ is said to be stable if 
it does not admit any blocking pair. 
Given two matchings µ,µ′ for G and a non-empty subset S of F∪W, we write: 
(i)  µ ≥S µ′ if µ(x) ≥x µ′(x) for all x ∈S; 
(ii)  µ >S µ′ if µ ≥S µ′ but µ ≠ µ′. 
 In the case where S is a singleton, S = {x}, we write µ ≥x µ′ to denote µ ≥ {x} µ′ 
and µ >x µ′ to denote µ >{x} µ′ . 
 
A stable matching µF for G is said to be F- optimal (i.e. optimal for firms) if  µF  
≥F µ, whenever µ  is any stable matching for G. 
A stable matching µW for G is said to be W- optimal (i.e. optimal for workers) if  
µW  ≥W µ, whenever µ  is any stable matching for G. 
 
3.  Some Preliminary Lemmas: 
 
Lemma 1: Let µ and   be stable matchings for a two-sided matching problem G. 
Let f ∈F and µ(f) = w∈W. If, µ(f) >
_
µ





µ w µ(w). Conversely, if 
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Proof :  Suppose µ , , f and w are as above. If w= µ(f) >
_
µ f  (f), then  (w) ≠ f. 








µ w f = µ(w). Conversely, if f = (w) >
_ _
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then since µ(f ) ≠ w, stability of µ requires that µ( ) 
_ _
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The following lemma extends one due to Knuth (1976): 
Lemma 2 : Let G be a two-sided matching problem, for which   is a stable 




µ F µ. If there does not exist 
f∈F, such that (f,   (f)) block µ, then µ  ≥
_
µ W  . 
_
µ
Proof : Towards a contradiction suppose that f = (w) >
_
µ w µ(w), for some w∈W. 
Since (f,   (f)) = (f,w) does not block µ, and since µ (f) ≠w, it must be the case 
that µ (f) >
_
µ




µ F µ, and proves the 
lemma. Q.E.D. 
 
Hence, if in Lemma 2, µ is a stable matching, then,   ≥
_
µ F µ. if and only if    4 





4.  The Gale-Shapley Theorem and its consequences:  
 
We begin this section by presenting the seminal theorem due to Gale and Shapley 
(1962). In an appendix to this paper we provide the procedure (Deferred 
Acceptance Procedure With Firms Making Offers) used to prove the theorem, 
since the same argument is required in the proofs of several theorems that follow. 
 
Theorem 1 (Gale and Shapley (1962)) : Every two-sided matching problem 
admits an F-optimal and a W- optimal stable matching. 
 
As a consequence of Lemma 2 and Theorem 1we obtain the following result: 
  
Corollary of Lemma 2 : Let G be a two-sided matching problem and suppose µ is 
an unstable matching, such that µF >F µ.. If there does not exist a pair (f, µF (f)) 
which blocks µ, then there exists f∈F and w∈W, such that µF(f) >f µ(f) and f >w 
µ(w). 
 
Proof : Suppose that there does not exist a pair (f, µF (f)) which blocks µ . Thus, 
there does not exist a pair (µF (w),w) which blocks µ. Thus, f = µF (w) >w µ (w) 
implies µ(f) >f w = µF(f). This contradicts µF >F µ. Thus, µ ≥WµF. Since µ is 
unstable there exists a pair (f,w) which blocks µ. Thus, w >f µ(f) and  f >w µ(w). If 
µF(f) ≥f w, then we are done. Hence suppose w >f µF(f). Since µF is stable, µF(w) 
>w f. Thus µF(w) >w µ(w). This contradicts, µ ≥WµF. Thus there exists f∈F and 
w∈W, such that µF(f) >f µ(f) and f >w µ(w). Q.E.D. 
  
Another direct consequence of a combination of Lemma 2 and the deferred 
acceptance procedure with firms making offers is the following theorem due to 
Gale and Sotomayor (1985 a,b). 
 
Theorem 2 ( Gale and Sotomayor ( 1985 a,b)) : Let G = <F,W, (Rx)x∈F∪W > and 
G′= <F,W′, (R
′
x)x∈X >, where W⊂  W′, X = F ∪W′ and Rx = R′x F∪W for all x∈ 
F∪W. 
Let µ F and µW be the F – optimal and W – optimal stable matchings for G. Let 
µ′F and µ′W be the F – optimal and W – optimal stable matchings for G′. Then, 
(i)  µF ≥W µ′F , µW ≥W µ′W; (ii) µ′W ≥F µW , µ′F ≥F µF . 
 
Proof : By the symmetry of the F- optimal stable matching and the W- optimal 
stable matchings and Lemma 2 it is enough to prove the following: 
(a) Let G = <F,W, (Rx)x∈F∪W > and G′= <F,W′, (R
′
x)x∈X >, where W⊂  W′, X = F 
∪W′ and Rx = R′x F∪W for all x∈ F∪W. Let µ F be the F – optimal for G 
and let µ′F be the F – optimal stable matchings for G′. Then, µ′F ≥F µF. .   5 
(b) Let G = <F,W, (Rx)x∈F∪W > and G′= <F',W, (R
′
x)x∈X >, where F⊂  F′, X = F' 
∪W and Rx = R′x F∪W for all x∈ F∪W. Let µ F be the F – optimal for G 
and let µ′F be the F – optimal stable matchings for G′. Then, µF ≥F µ'F. 
Let us first prove (a). Suppose that at the first step of the deferred acceptance 
procedure for G', a firm f is rejected by a worker w = µF(f). Since, worker w, 
proceeds up his ranking during the procedure, w rejects f in favor of some other 
firm f'. This follows from the fact that the set of firms acceptable to w is non-
empty. Since, f' made the offer to w at the very first step, f' ranks w first and 
hence above, µF(f'
 ). This contradicts the stability of µF. 
Suppose that up to a certain stage in the deferred acceptance procedure for G', no 
firm f is rejected by a worker w= µF(f). Suppose that at the next stage of the 
procedure for G', a firm f is rejected by a worker w = µF(f) in favor of another 
firm f'. Thus, w prefers f' to f. By the induction hypothesis, f
''has not been rejected 
by µF(f' ) up to the stage, where it makes the offer to w in the deferred acceptance 
procedure for G'. Since, f' moves one rank down at a time in the procedure, w 
µ ' f ≥ F(f' ). Since w ≠ µF(f' ), w     µ ' f > F(f' ), contradicting the stability of µF. Thus, 
even at this stage of the deferred acceptance procedure for G', no firm f is rejected 
by a worker w= µF(f). Since the procedure terminates in a finite number of steps, 
it must be the case that µ′F ≥F µF. 
Now let us prove (b). For a stage k of the deferred acceptance procedure for G 
and w∈W, let F
k(w) = {f∈F / m makes an offer to w}. For a stage k of the 
deferred acceptance procedure for G
’ and w∈W, let H
k(w) = {f∈F / f makes an 
offer to w}. Clearly, F
1(w) ⊂ H
1(w) for all w∈W. Further, for all w∈W, any firm 
who is rejected from F
1(w) is also rejected from H
1(w). Suppose that up to a stage 
K of the two procedures: [U  ⊂   for all w∈W] and [for all w∈W, 
any firm who is rejected from   by w at a stage k ≤ K, is also rejected 
from U  by w at the same stage or earlier ]. Suppose firm f makes an offer 
to worker w at stage K+1 in the deferred acceptance procedure for G. In that case 
there must have been a worker w', such that f ∈F
K
1 k



































k(w') for some k < K+1 and f was 
rejected by w' from U  at stage K. Thus, f ∈U , and f was rejected 
by w' from   at stage K. By the induction hypothesis, f ∈ U , 
and f was rejected by w' from  at stage K or earlier. Since each firm 
moves down its list of acceptable workers one rank at a time in the deferred 
acceptance procedure, the fact that f makes an offer to w after being rejected by w' 
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=  6 
for G'. Thus,   ⊂   . Further, any firm who is rejected from 
 at stage K+1, will also be rejected from  at stage K+1, unless 
it has already been rejected at an earlier stage. Thus, even up to stage K+1 of the 
two procedures, [  ⊂   for all w∈W] and [for all w∈W, any 
firm who is rejected from   by w at a stage k ≤ K+1, is also rejected from 
 by w at the same stage or earlier ]. Since each firm moves down its list 
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F ≥F µ'F. Q.E.D. 
 
5.  The Roth and Sotomayor theorem: 
 
Theorem 3 (Roth and Sotomayor (1990)): Let Let G = <F,W, (Rx)x∈F∪W > and 
G′= <F,W′, (R
′
x)x∈X >, where W′ = W∪{wo}, wo ∉W, X = F ∪W′ and Rx = R′x 
F∪W for all x∈ F∪W. Let µ* be the F- optimal stable matching for G and let 
µ** the W- optimal stable matching for G′. If wo is not single under µ**, then 
given any stable matching µ for G and µ' for G' there exists a non-empty subset S 
of firms, such that µ' >S µ and µ >W* µ', where W* = W∩µ*(S).  
 
Proof: We prove by induction on the cardinality of W that there exists a non-
empty subset S of firms, such that µ** >S µ* and µ* >W* µ**, where W* = 
W∩µ*(S). 
Let µ**(wo) = fo. Suppose #W = 1. Let W = {w}.  
(a) If w is single under µ*, then µ*(f) = f for all f∈F. Let S = {f0}. Thus, µ** >S 
µ*. Since, W*= φ, µ >W* µ** holds vacuously. 
(b) If µ*(w) = f≠fo, then µ*(fo) = f0. Let S = {f0}. Thus, µ** >S µ*. Since, W*= φ, 
µ* >W* µ** holds vacuously. 
(c)  If µ*(w) = fo, then for all f∈F\{fo}, w >ff implies fo >wf  by the stability of µ* 
and the fact that W = {w}. Further fo >w w. If fo prefers w to wo then the pair 
(fo,wo) would block µ** contradicting its stability. Thus, fo prefers wo to w. 
Let S = {f0}. Thus, µ** >S µ* and µ* >W* µ**, where W*= {w}. 
Hence the required assertion is true for #W = 1. 
Suppose the required assertion is true for #W = 1,…,k and now let #W = k+1. If 
µ*(fo) = fo, then by letting S = {fo}, the required assertion is easily seen to hold. 
Hence suppose µ*(fo) = w1 ∈W. Thus, w1 prefers fo to remaining single.  
Case 1: µ**(w1) = w1. 
If f0 prefers w1 to wo, then the pair (fo,w1) would block µ**, contradicting its 
stability. Thus fo prefers wo to w1. Let S = {f0}. Thus, µ** >S µ* and µ* >W* µ**, 
where W*= {w1}.   7 
Case 2: µ**(w1) = f1 ∈F. 
Let Z' = X\{w1}and Z = Z'\{wo}. Let G1 = <F,W'\{w1}, (Q'x)x∈Z' >, G2 = 
<F,W'\{w0,w1}, (Qx)x∈Z >, where for all x∈Z', Q'x = R'x|Z' and for all x∈Z, Qx = 
Rx|Z. Let µ be the F-optimal stable matching for G2 and µ' be the W-optimal 
stable matching for G1.  
By the induction hypothesis there exists a non-empty subset S of F, such that µ' >S 
µ and µ(w) >w µ'(w) for all w ∈(W\{w1})∩µ(S).  
By Theorem 2, µ** ≥F µ', µ ≥F µ*. 
Now, µ** ≥F µ', µ' >S µ  and µ ≥F µ* implies µ** >S µ*.  
By Lemma 2, µ* >W* µ**.   
It now follows by a standard induction argument that for all cardinalities of W, 
there exists a non-empty subset S of firms, such that µ** >S µ* and µ* >W* µ**, 
where W* = W∩µ*(S). 
Further µ* ≥F µ and µ** ≥W' µ'.  
By Lemma 2, µ' ≥F µ** and µ ≥W µ*. Hence, µ' ≥F µ**, µ** >S µ* and µ* ≥F µ 
implies µ' >S µ. Similarly, µ ≥W µ*, µ* >W* µ** and µ** ≥W' µ' implies µ >W* µ'.    
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Deferred Acceptance Procedure With Firms Making Offers (Gale and Shapley 
(1962)): To start each firm makes an offer to its favorite worker, i.e. to its first 
worker on its list of acceptable workers. Each worker rejects the offer of any firm 
who is unacceptable to him, and each worker who receives one or more 
acceptable offers, rejects all but his most preferred of these. Any firm whose offer 
is not rejected at this point is kept “pending”. 
At any step any firm whose offer was rejected at the previous step, makes an offer 
to its next choice (i.e., to its most preferred acceptable worker, among those who 
have not rejected its offer), so long as there remains an acceptable worker to 
whom it has not yet made an offer. If at any step of the procedure, a firm has 
already made offers to, and been rejected by all workers it finds acceptable, then it 
makes no further offers. Each worker receiving offers rejects any from 
unacceptable firms, and also rejects all but his most preferred among the group 
consisting of the new offers together with any firm that he may have kept pending 
from the previous step. 
The algorithm stops after any step in which no firm is rejected. At this point, 
every firm is either kept pending by some worker or has been rejected by every 
worker on its list of acceptable workers. The matching that is defined now, 
associates to each firm the worker who has kept him pending, if there be any. 
Further, workers who did not receive any offers at all and firms who have been 
rejected by all the workers on their list of acceptable workers, remain single. 
In the above procedure, each firm, proceeds down its list of acceptable workers, 
and each worker proceeds up his list of acceptable firms. 
Let us call this matching µF.  
 
Note : It follows from the deferred acceptance procedure that a worker who is not 
employed, either has a empty set of admissible firms or is ranked below the F-
optimal stable matching allocation of every firm. The latter, in particular implies 
that the concerned worker is unacceptable to any firm who in spite of being 
acceptable to the worker, does not employ any worker in the F-optimal stable 
matching. 
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